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Some Remarks on the Degree of Certainty 
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Until recently there have been many attempts to provide a precise characterization of 
modality in philosophy as well as in linguistics. Yet it cannot be said that the problems 
of modality have been thoroughly settled. One of the most problematic phenomena, for 
instance, with which many scholars have concerned themselves seems to be the semantic 
equivalence between two modals, or between a modal and an appropriate paraphrase. In  
particular, the semantic relationship and the related environments between may and can 
have been one of the subjects which many linguists have tried to account for without 
much success. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an explicit account of a degree of certainty of the 
English modals-among others, may, can, must and should in the epistemic sense. I 
will begin, with regard to this question, by making clear the differences between two 
alternative views which Leech and Lakoff have taken on this problem of epistemic may 
and can. And then I will point out that it would be necessary to revise Leech's proposal 
in some respects. In  addition, my concern will be turned to the compatibilities between 
must and should in their epistemic uses within the framework of possible worlds semantics. 
I1 
I t  is generally. assumed that may and can in the epistemic sense are equivalent to possible. 
Are they then to be derived from the same underling structure? Yet on closer investigation 
we notice that the following sentences are not precisely synonymous to each other. 
(1) a. The road may be blocked. 
b. The road can be blocked. 
(2) a. It may fall down tomorrow. 
b. It can fall down tomorrow. 
Sentences (la) and @a), according to Leech, express the possibility of a fact, whereas 
(lb) and (2b) express the possibility of an idea." Thus, may can be paraphrased by 'It 
is possiblk ...', but can by 'It is possible for ... to ...', as in (3). 
(3 )  a. I t  is possible that the road is blocked. 
b. I t  is possible for the road to be blocked. 
Apparently (3a) and (3b) are not to be related to the same underlying structure. Leech 
also goes on to claim that factual possibility is stronger than theoretical possibility by 
illustrating the following  example^:^) 
(4 )  a. The pound may be devalued. 
b. The pound can be devalued. 
That is, sentence (4a) could be mentioned at  a financial crisis, whereas sentence (4b) at  
any time. This account seems to be almost similar to Ehrman's claim that can is used to 
refer only to circumstance regardless of the occurrence of the action, whereas may "always 
refers to an openness to oc~urrence."~) 
However, the epistemic modals may and can are, as Leech himself acknowledges, so 
often interchangeable that we have much difficulty in drawing a distnction between both 
of them.4) Thus it seems too much to say that may has a higher degree of certainty than 
can without considering different types of possibility as we shall consider later. In what 
follows, let us consider the alternative accounts put forward by Lakoff. 
(5) a. Football players may be sex maniacs. 
b. Football players can be sex maniacs. 
Lakoff provides a somewhat plausible account of the semantic difference between may 
and can in opposition to Leech's elucidation. According to her," sentence (5a) is truth- 
neutral, that is to say, it leaves the qucstion of truth and falsehood of the statement open, 
whereas sentence (5b) implies the truth and falsehood of the statement it contains, and 
thus it is called truth-committed. 
Furthermore, Lakoff shows the semantic difference between may and can in terms of 
different kinds of quantification. Sentence (5a) can be represented as (6) by using the 
quantifiers, and sentence (5b) is atucally triply ambiguous, so represented as (78) to (7c) 
re~pectively.~) 
(6)  a. Football players may be sex maniacs. 
2)  Ibid., p. 76. 
3)  Ehrman (1966) tried to account for the meaning of the epistemic may in terms of two dimen- 
sions, that is, 'occurrence' and 'circumstance'. p. 23. 
4) From the diachronic point of view (Visser, p. 1734), this results from the fact that many 
of the semantic changes of may and can have occurred through the history of the English 
language. The  original meaning of may (OE magan) is 'to* have, the physical capa'bility', 
the trace of which can be found in the noun might (=ability), whereas can in Old English, 
(cunnan) was used to refer to 'mental or intellectual capability'. Hence, we can say that in 
the Old English period may is stronger than can in the epistemic sense. 
5) Lakoff (19721, p. 230. 
6 )  Ibid., p. 232. 
(86ir) (V') (Vt) SM (x, t,. wg 
where x=football players, w=worlds, t=times 
(7) a. Any given football player sometimes is, sometimes isn't, a sex maniac. 
(Vx) (Ht) SM (x, t) 
b. Some football' players are always sex maniacs, and some football prayers aren't. 
(ax)' (vt) SM (x, t) 
C. Some football players are sometimes sex maniacs, sometimes not; and some football 
players are not. 
(ax3 (zt) SM (x, t) 
As these examples demonstrate, with may. there is quantificatibn over possible worlids, 
but not with can. And the use of can implies truth in the speaker's own world, so it is 
falsifiable given the contrary evidence. Hence, Lakoff cl'aims tliat can is stronger than may 
with regard to a degree of certainty, as opposed to Leecli's accounts. What, then, makes 
two alternative views seem contrad'ictory to each other? In  the following section, our, 
special attention will be paid to explicating t.his question more clearly. 
Now let us consider the following sentences that show the use of may, in which possi- 
bility is expressed together with the element of doubt. 
(8) a. It may rain tomorrow. 
b. He said he thought it might rain. 
c. I may be away from home tomorrow. 
d. .The news may, or may not, be true. 
Evidently sentences such as (8a) to (8d) iklustrate that i t  would be necessary to refine 
Leech's claim that the sentences which containmay have a higher degree of certainty than 
those which contain can in a. straiglitforward way. This problem, then, leads to the 
necessity. of subdividing the- concept of possibility which* epistemic modals may and can. 
express. 
Let us now turn our attent-ion to t'he following that demonstrate the use of: may to' 
indicate a possibility that arises naturally, or i s  the result of arrangement. We notke, in 
this case, little or no element of' uncertainty unlike the. sefit'ences in (8). 
(3) a, You may go from A to B by changing trains at C. 
b. Specimen copies of these of these books may be obtained on application to the publisher. 
c. A plam of the new housing estate may be seen at, the offices-of the Town Cou.mil,. 
We can replace may by can in the case where the epistemic may refers to a possibility 
with no indication of doubt or uncertamty: 
(10) a. You can go from A to B by changing trains at C. 
b. Specimen copies of these books can be obtained on application to the publisher. 
c. A plan of the new housing estate can be seen a t  the offices of the Town Council. 
Judging from the sentences given so far, it follows that we can draw a distinction between 
general possibility as shown in (9) and (10) and occasional possibility as in (8). This is 
true of the epistemic modal can. It is possible that the epistemic can falls into two different 
types: general possibility and occasional possibility as shown in (11) and (12), respectvely. 
(11) a. You can ski on the hills (because there is enough snow). 
b. You can't bathe here on account of the sharks ( ie,  it isn't safe). 
c. Can you get to the top of the mountain in one day? (That is, is it possible?) 
(12) a. Measles can be dangerous, (Sometimes it is for it to be quite dangerous/sometimes it is  
quite dangerous.) 
b. The  Straits of Dover can be very rough. (It is possible for the Straits of Dover to be 
rough;, this sometimes happens.) 
The sentences ( l la)  to ( l lc)  indicating general possibility show that the epistemic modal 
can seems to be stronger than may with reference to a degree of certainty. For this is 
quite different from the kind of possibility expressed by may. Since the use of the epistemic 
can, as Lakoff claims, generally implies truth in the speaker's own world, it can be falsi- 
fiable in natunal languages. With may, however, there can be no possibility of verification 
in other possible worlds. 
Consider the following examples: 
(13) a. A situation like this may occur from time to time. 
b. A situation like this can occur from time to time. 
These sententences illustrate that may, and can are used to refer to actions that sometimes 
happen, that is, to indicate occasional possibility.?) In this case, we cannot easily judge 
which of &both modals has a higher degree of certainty. In fact, may and can in the epis- 
temic sense can be, as Palmer points out8), so often interchangeable because of the neg- 
ative notion of 'no obstacle', and thus in this respect it seems to revise Leech's claim that 
may is stronger thqn can, with reference ,to a degree of possibility. 
From what we have so far observed, we may draw the following conclusion: when the 
epistemic modals may and can are used to refer to occasional possibility, both modals have 
the same degree of certainty, but when they refer to general possibility, in particular as 
shown in ( l l ) ,  can has a higher degree of certainty than may. In other words, the epis- 
7) Palmer (1979, p. 153) claims tIiat can is never ' used for epistemic modality in assertive 
utterances in which only may is appropriate. Thus he treats can in (13b) as existential 
modality. For instance, 
(a) Roses can be mauve. (Some roses are mauve.) 
(b) The  weather can be awful. (Sometimes the weather is awful.) 
However, it seems to me that this is far from being obvious in all contexts. 
8) Palmer (19741, p. 118. 
temic can implies the speaker's own world, and we can, therefore, easily verify the truth 
of the statement, whereas may implies every possible world, which prevents us from con- 
firming the truth of the given statement. Hence, we can say that Leech's suggestion appears 
to be too strong to accept, since the distinction between may and can, with reference to a 
degree of certainty, depends simply upon the factual/theoretical relationship. 
In the following section, I will consider the compatabilities between must and should 
within the framework of possible worlds semantics. In their epistemic uses, must and should 
are semantically equivalent with a slight difference of meaning, according to the traditional 
accounts. Yet this is far from being obvious in a large number of contexts, and thus it 
would be necessary to explore this question any further. 
Just as may and can are put toghter in their epistemic uses, so should and must are both 
considered equivalent to probable in the same way. As a rule, the epistemic should has been 
assumed to be a weaker equivalent of must. This assumption as it stands, however, should 
be more explicitly investigated than has been generally considered. 
First let us have a closer look at  the following sentences: 
He must be home by now. 
He should be home by now. 
He should be there, but he isn't. 
*He must be there, he isn't. 
He works very hard, so he should pass his exam easily next year. 
*He works very hard, so he must pass his exam easily next year. 
He looks quite exhausted, and he must have had no sleep last night. 
*He looks quite exhausted, and he should have had no sleep last night. 
As these examples show, sentences such as (l4a) and (14b) are so often interchangeable, 
of course, with a slight difference of meaning; that is to say, must expresses a somewhat 
higher degree of certainty than should. Thus (14a) and (14b) are paraphrased by (18a) 
and (18b), respectively. 
(18) a. I am sure that he is at home by now. 
b. It is probable that he is at home by now. 
Yet the epistemic modals should and must cannot be always replaced by each other, as 
shown in ( 1 9 ,  (16) and (17). Hence, it seems necessary to examine more explicitly a 
variety of verbal and situational contexts in order to provide a precise characterization of 
semantic equivalence or difference between should and must. 
The following examples illustrate that there are environments in which only one of both 
modals is appropriate. 
(19) a. You must be crazy! 
b. *You should be crazy! 
c. This should be done by later this afternoon. 
d: *This must be done by later this afternoon. 
The epistemic should is, according to Lakff, used in the case of a probability based upon 
future expectation, whereas must in the case of a probability based upon present conjecture.'' 
Similarly, in (16b) must cannot be used to refer to the probability an event located in the 
future. 
NOW let us consider the appropriate contextual environments of the epistemic modals 
should and must within the framework of possible worlds semantics. When a certain sentence 
which contains the epistemic modal should or must is generated by means of syntactic rules, 
the corresponding semantic machinery assigns a meaning to it. And the entity of a meaning 
assigned to thc sentence is what we may call a 'proposition'. But in in this paper, I am 
interested, with regard to a proposition, only in the fact that it is either true or false in 
a possible world. 
(20) a. It had started to rain. 
b. They stopped playing tennis. 
These two sentences demonstrate the relation of 'causality' between two propositions. In 
other words, sentence (20a) is the cause of (20b). In addition, it is possible to draw 
sentences (22a), (22b) and (23a), but not (23b) fram sentence (21). 
(21) a. He has had no sleep for 48 hours. 
b. He is quite exhausted. 
(22) a. He has had no sleep for 48 hours, so he must be quite exhausted. 
b. He has had no sleep for 48 hours, so he should be quite exhausted. 
(23) a. He is qui?e exhausted and he must have had no sleep for 48 hours. 
b. *He is quite exhausted and he should have had no sleep for 48 hours. 
The sentences like (22) and (23) consist of two prpositions: the asserted proposition and 
the inferred proposition. If the speaker states the truth of a fact in the asserted proposition 
as in (22), it can be inferred from this that the event mentioned in the inferred propo- 
sition, has a good chance of realization. But he cannot state that clalm unequivocally, 
because he expresses his hypothesis in terms of a high degree of probability, rather than 
certainty. 
Judging from the iliustrztions given so far, it seems that with must the relation of 
inference can, as Riviere points out, work either from cause to consequence of from 
consequence to cause, exemplified by (22a) and (23a) respe~tively.'~) In  contrast, with 
should the realtion of inference can work from "cause to consequen'ce as shown in (22b), 
but not from consequence to cause as in (23b). As have been mentioned earlier, the 
9) Lakoff, p. 234. 
10) Rivikre (19811, p. 183. 
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epistemic modals must and should in their uses have much to do with time specification; 
that is, must and should are based upon present conjecture and future expectation, respec- 
tively. In general, time specification involves three notions of time: speech time, reference 
time and event time. Speech time is the time at  which .the utterance is made. Refernece 
time is the time from which the speaker invites his audience to consider the occurrence of 
the event. Event time refers to the time at  which the speaker asserts the event described 
in the sentence to occur. 
Now let us return to the examples such as (14), (15), (16) and (17) and have a closer 
look a t  them in terms of the relation of causality and temporal specification we have just 
assumed. When both must and should are permitted, as in (14) and (22), the inferred 
proposition is consequence. And the time of event is either simultaneous with or anterior 
to the time of speech in both of these sentences. Thus the relation between the temporal 
points associated with utterance of sentence (14) may be represen~ed roughly as follows: 
(24) S: Present RT:  now R T = S T  E T c S T ,  E T = S T  
where RT, ST, and E T  represent respectively the times of reference, speech, and event, 
and the arrow indicates anteriority. 
Moreover, in such cases as (14) and (22) in which both must and should are allowed, 
it can be held that should or ought to is a weaker equivalent of must. In other cases, 
however, in which only one of both modals is appropriate, it seems necessary 'to explore in 
greater detail this problem of a degree of certainty between must and should in the epistemic 
sense. 
In  sentence (16), on the other hand, which allows only should, but not must, the 
inferred proposition is, beyond question, consequence. As we have seen earlier, must 
cannot be used to refer to the possibility of an event in the future. And this can be 
accounted for in terms of the relation of causality and time specification between two 
propositions as in the above cases. But it is the time relation between the speech time and 
the event time that determines the acceptatibility of (16a) and the unacceptability of (16b), 
In  other words, with must in (16b) the time of event is posterior to the time of speech. 
We can represent the relation between the temporal points associated with the utterance of 
.(16b) like this: 
(25) *S: Future RT: next year RT+ST ET-tST ET:next year 
The arrow in this representation stands for posteriority. Hence, it follows that the epistemic 
must cannot be used to refer to the actuality of an action which is based upon future 
expectation. 
Now let us turn to the cases in which the inferred proposition containing must and should 
is the cause of the asserted proposition as opposed to the cases as in (16). The following 
examples show that only must is possible in these cases. 
(26) a. He was absent from school today; and he must have caught a bad cold. 
b. *He was absent from school today, and he should have caught a bad cold. 
(27) a. An ambulance stops at  his door, and he must be ill. 
b. *An ambulance stops at  his door, and he should be ill. 
From the above sentences we notice that, since should and ought to allow of the possibility 
of non-occurrence, the inferred proposition which indicate the cause of the asserted 
propositions cannot contain the epistemic should and ought to. 
To sum up, the semantic difference between must and should does not merely lie in the 
fact that the former has a higher degree of certainty than the latter in all environments; 
but rather, both modals are closely associated with the notion of causality and with the 
time specification, by which their uses are determined and the distinction between both 
modals can be drawn more explicitly, as we have already seen. And with regard to a 
degree of certainty, we are able to argue for the fact that certainty of the epistemic modal 
is the highest in degree when only must is allowed, as shown in (17) and (23), compared 
with the other cases. 
As we have thus far observed, the epistemic modals can be aligned according to the 
degree of certainty that the speaker feels, ranging from necessity in the case of must to 
mere possibility in the case of can and may. In this paper I have argued, with reference 
to the question of the degree of certainty between may and can and between must and 
should in their epistemic uses, that there needs to be some further elaboration in order to 
provide a more explicit account of this problem. In particular, I suggest that the meaning 
of possibility which the epistemic may and can express, should fall into two different types: 
general possibility and occasioal possibility, since Leech's assertion that may is stronger than 
can seems to be too strong to accept in all situations. In addition to this, I have demon- 
strated that it would be necessary to investigate various cases any further so as to explicate 
the semantic difference between must and should in a consistent way. 
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